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In any public policy making process, political and economic forces are at play in 
resolving the strategic interactions among the public and special interests. A 
schematic representation of the policy making process reflecting these forces is 
represented in Figure 1. Historically, the right-hand box has been the domain of 
political science, while the left-hand box has been the domain of economics. At the 
top of the right box, particular governance structures set the constitutional design 
establishing voting rules, the rule of law, property rights, laws governing exchange, 
and more generally the rules by which rules are made. Governance structures also 
determine the nature and scope of the political feedback mechanisms from groups 
affected by public policies. In its most expansive representation, any causal analysis 
of constitutional rules investigates the implications of alternative legal, regulatory and 
institutional frameworks, as well as various degrees of political, civil, and economic 
freedoms. In other words, governance structures set the boundaries for the political 
economic link. Over the course of the last few decades, economists have begun to 
make significant theoretical and empirical advancements in analyzing the link 
between governance structures, political economics, and the selection of actual 
policies. 
Political economic analysis seeks to explain the selection and implementation 
of public policies. This link in the policy-making process endogenizes the instrument 
settings as a function of governmental bureaucracy and the actions of stakeholders. 
Interest groups, as agents representing stakeholders, are the units of analysis. In these 
links of the policy-making process, interest groups compete by spending time, energy, 
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and money on the production of pressure to influence both the design and the tactical 
implementation of policies. 
The box at the bottom of Figure 1 recognizes that the implementation of public 
policies can lead to both intended and unintended consequences. For this link, the 
potential strategic conduct of both public and private sector agents and their 
representatives becomes critical. Modern economics has used the concepts of 
asymmetric information, incentive compatibility, participation constraints, and 
credible commitments to isolate the incentives embodied in specific policy regimes. 
Unintended consequences often result from hidden actions or hidden information. 
Hidden actions are typically characterized as moral hazard problems, while hidden 
information is generally divided into adverse selection or signaling problems. 
Once policies are designed and/or implemented, the process of incidence 
begins with the assessment of winners and losers. Some groups or segments of the 
market may bear costs associated with public policies while other groups may reap 
gains. The actual incidence of any designed and implemented public policy depends 
on individual agent incentives and ultimately on the market structure. The economic 
consequences are generally measured both in terms of economic growth or the size of 
the economic pie and its distribution among various interests. These economic 
consequences in turn lead to a distribution of political power, represented in the top 
box of Figure 1. 
Much of the academic literature compartmentalizes the links depicted in 
Figure 1. This compartmentalization has allowed at least four analytical dimensions of 
public policy to be distinguished in accordance with their imposed assumptions or 
maintained hypotheses (Rausser and Goodhue 2002). Until the last few decades, the 
vast majority of public policy analysis has focused on an incidence analytical 
dimension represented in the left box of Figure 1. For this dimension, the impact of 
existing policies and/or the consequences of alternative policy instruments are 
evaluated. The second analytical dimension generally takes place at the policy 
implementation link of Figure 1. For this dimension, the perfect implementation 
assumption is relaxed allowing the application of mechanism design concepts while 
still maintaining no feedback effects from interest group or coalition formation, and a 
given governance structure. Modern political economy is a third analytical dimension 
that comes in many shapes and forms. All of these formulations, however, relax the 
assumption of no feedback effects from interest group or coalition formation, but 
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typically impose a given governance structure. A fourth analytical dimension that has 
gained recent favor focuses on governance structures that delineate the boundaries on 
the negotiations and bargaining that takes place among stakeholders and 
governmental agents. In its most general form, this analytical dimension relaxes the 
assumptions of perfect implementation, no feedback effects among interest group or 
coalition formation as well as given governance structures. As reflected in Figure 1, 
this dimension is capable of analyzing how the distribution of political power leads to 
alternative governance structures.  
  In the context of this general framework, the purpose of this chapter is to 
isolate three principal policy instruments: redistributive instruments, national public 
good expenditures, and local public good expenditures. Not until the recent work in 
general economics has there been drawn a sharp distinction between national public 
good and local public good expenditures. In much of the work on agricultural 
distortions, only a general distinction between national public good policies 
(particularly agricultural research and development) and redistributive policies have 
been examined, including the joint determination hypothesis (Rausser 1982, 1992). In 
accordance with North’s seminal work (1981), we treat as synomymous public good 
policies as productive or PERT (political economic research transactions) policies. To 
be consistent with recent economic literature, PERT interventions are national public 
policies that are intended to correct for institutional and market failures by reducing 
transaction costs of the private economic system. In contrast, both local public 
policies and redistributive policies can be treated as synonymous with predatory 
policies or PEST (political economic seeking transfers) policies. With these policies 
come deadweight losses and wasteful political economic activities resulting from rent-
seeking of interest groups or policymaking authorities. 
  For the three generic groups of policies -- national productive policies, local 
productive/redistributive policies, and pure redistributive or predatory policies -- our 
purpose is to isolate the potential causal influence of political institutional structures, 
the assigned authority for governmental decisionmaking, the role of market structure 
and other socioeconomic characteristics, and finally the effect of sector mobility and 
asset diversification. In the next section, we investigate recent political governance 
structures and their potential implications for agricultural distortions. The focus is on 
the role of democratic mechanisms that have distinguished presidential from 
parliamentary regimes. We also investigate the potential explanatory role of electoral 
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rules that have been theoretically examined in a number of recent publications.
1 
  As revealed in the recent theoretical literature, the critical role of the 
separation of powers under different political systems has implications for the 
specification of the assigned authorities for actual settings on the policy instruments. 
Accordingly, in the third section of this chapter, we specify polycentric configurations 
comprised of policymaking centers and the influence and pressure that is brought to 
bear on the policymaking process by organized interest groups. This framework 
recognizes that most policies that are implemented are determined by a combination 
of national and local decisions, for example, state, county, province, individual 
communities (Cremer and Palfrey 2000). The objective functions of the various 
governmental policymaking centers and the organized interest groups determine what 
is relevant from a particular country’s market structure.  
  In the fourth section, we turn to the empirical analysis for each of the three 
types of policy instruments. We suggest reduced form econometric specifications, 
paying particular attention to the various explanatory variables that are suggested by 
our review of the recent theoretical literature. For the dependent variables, 
decomposing nominal rates of assistance into their various sources (such as taxes or 
subsidies on imports, exports, domestic output or intermediate inputs) results in time 
series data for the redistributive policy instruments, but expenditures on national and 
local public goods will require additional data sources. For the explanatory variable, 
emphasis is placed on two potential variables, sector mobility and asset 
diversification, which are often swept under the rug in recent theoretical formulations 
of political economy (Grossman and Helpman 1994, 1995, 2001).  
 
 
Political institutional structures: implications for agricultural distortions  
 
 
On an economy-wide basis in democratic societies, the traditional framework for 
evaluating political economy issues is the median voter model. It has been the 
workhorse model for most work in political economy in the last few decades. The 
                                                 
1 In the recent debate within Congress on the 2008 farm legislation in the United States, coalitions were 
formed that are largely reflective of electoral rules. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi has supported the 
continued heavy subsidization of US agriculture as a means for protecting newly elected Democrats 
from conservative midwest farming districts. 
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median voter model predicts that policy in a democracy with competitive elections 
will cater to the preferences of the median voter. Competitive forces in a two-party 
system will lead to convergence of electoral platforms towards the preferences of the 
median voter.  
Economists have always known the technical problems associated with the 
median voter model. It is restricted to one policy dimension, to two competing parties, 
and it assumes perfect knowledge about voter preferences and politicians who only 
care about being elected and have no intrinsic preferences for policy. Apart from its 
technical weaknesses, the empirical predictions of the median voter model have also 
often been at odds with reality. Its main prediction, that more income inequality will 
lead to more redistribution, has been contradicted by recent economic trends which 
have seen strong increases in inequality but few increases in redistribution. On the 
contrary, many countries such as the US, the UK and others have had reductions in 
redistribution associated to increases in inequality.  
Closer to our concerns, the median voter model does not fit nicely in the 
political economy of agricultural policy. The fact that support for agriculture is 
universal in the more affluent countries can only be made consistent with the median 
voter model if we believe that the median voter is a farmer. In most advanced 
economies, it is difficult to argue that there are many farmer incomes at the median 
income level. If we cannot make sense of the observed political support for 
agriculture using the electoral channel, then we should conclude that the only channel 
through which agricultural interests get expressed is through lobbying and political 
pressure. Such an argument might be more convincing for generic trade policy but 
seems less convincing for agricultural policy since agricultural and rural votes are 
generally courted during campaigns. As a result, we must develop models other than 
the standard median voter formulation that might account for observed patterns of 
agricultural distortions.  
There has been much progress already in the theory of political economy away 
from the traditional median voter model (Persson and Tabellini 2000). This progress 
has generated many new insights. Some of these new results are very promising and 
make it possible to construct more plausible electoral channels for the political 
economy of agricultural distortions. The newer class of theories tends to incorporate 
more institutional details than the standard median voter model. These institutional 
features include the comparison of electoral rules, different rules for choosing and 
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ousting the executive, as well as different rules for designing and making legislative 
decisions. Moreover, the newer theories have lifted the unsatisfactory restriction of a 
single-dimensional policy space. Different classes of models such as the probabilistic 
voting models (Lindbeck and Weibull 1987) or partisan and citizen-candidate models 
(Alesina 1988, Osbourne and Slivinsky 1996, Besley and Coate 1998) can tackle 
multi-dimensional policy spaces in a rather standard fashion. The resulting 
formulations make it possible to analyze and test predictions relative to the 
composition of public expenditures as well as the policy mix of PERTs and PESTs in 
various countries. In particular, it makes it possible to generate predictions relative to 
the importance of special interest politics and expenditures and policies targeted to 
narrow interest groups (PESTs) versus general interest politics (PERTs) whose public 
goods benefiting large groups of the population. While this literature is still in its 
infancy, interesting results have been generated for at least two major categories, 
namely, the comparative politics of democratic regimes, and the comparative politics 
of electoral rules. Consider each in turn. 
 
The comparative politics of democratic regimes 
 
A major distinction in political science is between democracies and non-democracies. 
This is of course a difference of first order. There are, however, also differences 
between democracies themselves. The literature has distinguished two main types of 
democratic regimes: presidential and parliamentary regimes. These two regimes differ 
in the relations between the executive and legislative branch of government.  
In a parliamentary democracy, the executive is chosen (or supported) by a 
majority in parliament. The government is formed after parliamentary elections, 
usually by the party perceived to have won the elections, or the party who has 
received the most votes. If the winning party has the majority of elected 
representatives in parliament, then the government is formed by that party alone. 
Otherwise, a coalition government is formed with one or several other parties with 
which a coalition agreement is forged. The government is thus formed directly as a 
result of the outcome of parliamentary elections.  
At least equally important is the fact that the executive can be brought down at 
any time by the parliament via a vote of confidence. A legislative bill can generally 
always be associated with a vote of confidence in the government. Different 
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parliamentary democracies have different vote of confidence rules, but they all share 
the feature that a majority of representatives in parliament has the power to bring 
down the executive by a vote of no confidence. Votes of confidence are usually more 
threatening when they come from inside the government coalition. Members of the 
coalition need not fear a confidence vote initiated by the opposition, since the 
opposition usually only commands a minority of votes. However, it has happened 
repeatedly that a party belonging to the coalition brings up a vote of confidence in 
order to make the government fall.  
In a presidential democracy, the executive is elected independently of the 
legislative branch of government, usually by popular vote, and cannot be brought 
down by the legislature except in extraordinary circumstances such as an 
impeachment procedure. Impeachment procedures are exceptional and justified by 
exceptional circumstances, certainly not by political disagreement as is the case with a 
vote of confidence. The source of power of the executive thus lies with the electorate 
and is independent of the majority coalition in the legislative branch of government. 
These institutional differences between presidential and parliamentary 
democracies have implications that affect decision-making and the policy mix. First 
of all, presidential systems have more separation of powers between the executive and 
legislative branch of government since the source of power of the executive is 
independent of the legislative branch and since it cannot be voted down by the 
legislature as is the case in parliamentary democracies. This stronger separation of 
power between both branches of government implies potentially more conflicts 
between the executive and the legislative branch of government. Second, 
parliamentary systems have more legislative cohesion. This means that there is 
stronger voting discipline. Not only do elected representatives from the same party 
generally vote the same way but members from the governing coalition also do. This 
is closely related to the fact that a vote of confidence can be associated with a 
legislative bill. Indeed, since members of the governing coalition have majority 
support in the legislature, they also carry a lot of agenda-setting powers, since only 
the coalition parties can make legislative proposals that have a material probability of 
being accepted. The possibility to associate a vote of confidence to a bill acts as a 
credible threat to discipline members of the coalition. A coalition member who would 
want to deviate from the majority and vote against a coalition proposal would be 
deterred from doing so if the other members threaten to stage a vote of confidence. 
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This would lead to a fall of the government and a possible change of coalition, 
representing a loss of precious agenda-setting powers for the incumbent coalition.  
Persson, Roland and Tabellini (2000) have examined theoretically and 
empirically the implications of these policy differences on the policy mix within the 
framework of an accountability model, that is, a model where voters can vote 
retrospectively to punish elected representatives who have not brought them an 
endogenously determined utility level, in terms of the policy mix. The main results are 
that presidential systems have a smaller size of government and a composition of 
government expenditures that is less tilted towards national public goods and more 
towards local public goods and smaller rents to politicians. These results are derived 
from the two institutional features defined above.  
The separation of powers under a presidential system creates checks and 
balances between the executive and the legislative branch of government. These 
checks and balances make it possible to exploit the conflict of interest between both 
branches of government (Madison, Federalist Paper No. 10). If the executive branch 
controls the agenda-setting power over the size of the budget but that the legislative 
branch controls the agenda-setting power over composition of expenditures and that 
the approval of both is needed in each case, the separation of powers allows the 
exploitation of the conflict between both in the interest of voters.  
The executive branch has no interest in proposing a large budget size since the 
composition of expenditures will favor the constituencies who control the legislature. 
On the contrary, in order to be reelected by its own constituency, the president’s 
interest is to propose a low budget. Separation of powers thus makes it possible to 
obtain a smaller size of government. It is a device to prevent collusion against voters. 
This is not the case in a parliamentary democracy. Since the executive emanates from 
the majority in the legislature, the same party or parties control both the legislature 
and the executive branch of government. There are thus less checks and balances 
between both branches of government. There is thus no internal institutional 
mechanism to limit the size of government. The only force present is the reelection 
motive. The majority in parliament must satisfy the demands of their voters. This can 
help limit taxation but only to a limited degree. Indeed, it is always possible to “tax 
the minority” in order to please the majority constituencies. The smaller size of 
government may serve to support or detract from economic growth. However, 
separation of powers will lead to fewer rents for politicians, as the conflict of interest 
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between them will prevent collusion to capture rents. This is not the case in a 
parliamentary regime. 
The legislative cohesion, on the other hand, makes it possible to service in a 
stable way broad constituencies representing the majority in place. This feature of 
parliamentary democracy makes it possible to provide general public goods to a 
majority. Indeed, as the costs are internalized broadly within the government 
coalition, providing these public goods is politically advantageous to the incumbent 
majority. In contrast, the absence of legislative cohesion in a presidential system leads 
to a failure to provide as large an amount of public goods as in a parliamentary 
democracy. The reason is that within a presidential system, the lack of legislative 
cohesion leads to ad hoc coalitions, on a case by case basis. Representatives of the 
same party also vote less often with their party, especially if they feel they need to do 
so to protect their constituencies’ interests.  
Since the politician who controls the agenda can build coalitions on an ad hoc 
basis, he or she can exploit the desire of other representatives to be part of the 
coalition. Indeed the latter will compete to be part of a majority on a given bill and 
will bid down their demands, giving de facto the bargaining power to the agenda-
setter. The latter will trade off her own constituencies’ narrow interests against 
personal rents in order to be reelected. As a result, in a presidential system, there is 
under-provision of national public goods and politicians focus more on “pork”, that is, 
on local public goods for their own narrow constituency. Presidential systems will 
thus, in contrast to parliamentary systems, have a composition of public expenditures 
that is more focused towards local public goods and less towards national public 
goods. Of course, this is directly related to the differences in legislative cohesion in 
the two systems, which is derived from the institution of the vote of confidence in a 
parliamentary democracy.  
These results have a flavor of reality if one compares the parliamentary 
democracies of Europe with the presidential system in the US. The US has a smaller 
size of government but it also lags in the provision of some general public goods such 
as health and education. The predictions of the model have also been borne out in 
empirical work by Persson and Tabellini (2003). One should, however, keep in mind 
that not all presidential systems have a strong separation of powers between the 
executive and the legislative branch of government. In strong presidential systems like 
in Russia and Eastern Europe, but also in various Latin American countries, the 
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elected legislature has much less powers than the US Congress and there is strong 
concentration of powers in the hands of the president.  
What are the implications of the comparative politics of democratic regimes 
for the political economy of agricultural distortions?  If these distortions take mainly 
the form of local public goods, or redistributive policy instruments, via special 
subsidies to agriculture for example, then we should observe relatively more 
distortions in presidential systems than in parliamentary systems for developed 
countries and vice versa for developing countries whose rural population represents a 
large proportion of the total population. This prediction has not yet been tested. The 
theory also predicts that the public good component of support to agriculture (PERTs) 
is likely to be stronger in parliamentary systems.  
 
The comparative politics of electoral rules  
 
Electoral rules are also thought to have an important impact on policy. This is because 
they affect the rules of democratic selection of representatives, and this may affect the 
actions taken by the latter when in power in order to be reelected. In principal, one 
should distinguish between electoral rules in parliamentary democracies and in 
presidential democracies, but this has not been seriously examined in the literature. In 
some cases this should not matter, but in others it might. In assessing the differences 
between electoral rules, we briefly outline the applicability of the results in both types 
of democratic regimes.  
The two main polar electoral rules are the majoritarian electoral rule and the 
proportional electoral rule. There are other electoral rules and variants of both 
majoritarian and proportional, but they are the most common and are also polar 
opposites.  
Under the proportional electoral rule, the representation of a party in terms of 
seat share in the legislature is proportional to the vote share of that party. Exact 
proportionality can never be obtained because representatives, contrary to vote shares, 
come in discrete numbers and there are various methods to convert vote shares into 
seats. Nevertheless, seat shares are approximately equal to vote shares. Countries with 
proportional electoral rule have generally large district magnitudes, potentially 
covering the whole country as is the case in the Netherlands or in Israel.  
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Large district magnitudes are consistent with the proportional rules since the 
larger the number of seats that need to be allocated the closer vote shares and seat 
shares will be. To give an example, say that one party has 65 percent of the votes and 
the other has 35 percent of the votes: if a district has only two seats, it will, even 
under proportional rule, generally allocate the two seats to the winning party, whereas 
if the district has 200 seats then the first party will have 130 seats and the other 70 
seats. In the latter case, the seat shares will be exactly equal to the vote shares, but not 
in the former case. Therefore, researchers tend to use a higher district magnitude 
(larger number of seats competing in an electoral district) as an indication of a higher 
proportionality of seat shares to vote shares.  
Under the majoritarian electoral rule, the winner of an election is the candidate 
with the plurality of votes, that is, having more votes than all other candidates. 
Majoritarian electoral rule is therefore usually associated with single-member 
districts. Majoritarian electoral rule may deviate significantly from proportionality. 
Suppose that one party gets 55 percent in all districts and the other gets 45 percent in 
all districts. According to majoritarian electoral rule, the first party should have 
hundred percent of the seats and the second zero percent. Researchers usually 
interpret a smaller district size as closer to majoritarian. Note first that a single-
member district is majoritarian by definition. Since there is only one seat, it must go 
to the winner. However, in the example above with two seats, one senses that it is 
closer to majoritarian than to proportional.  
To summarize, under proportional electoral rule, seat shares are proportional 
to vote shares and under majoritarian electoral rule, the party who gains the most 
votes in a district wins the seat. The larger the district magnitude, the more 
proportional the electoral rule and the smaller the district magnitude, the closer it is to 
the majoritarian rule.  
Differences in electoral rules are also found to influence policy-making, and a 
literature has developed in recent years to explore these distinctions. Lizzeri and 
Persico (2001) and Persson and Tabellini (1999) have examined the effect of electoral 
rules on policy in the framework of a two-party competition with a multi-dimensional 
policy space. Both have models that deviate from the standard median voter model in 
the sense that they are able to deal with multiple policy dimensions. The former use a 
methodology advanced by Myerson (1993), inspired by the colonel Blotto games, 
where candidates choose platforms in the form of mixed strategies. The latter use the 
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probabilistic voting model. In both papers, the main difference between the two 
electoral rules lies in district magnitude. There is assumed to be only one district 
under proportional rule and a large number of single-member districts under 
majoritarian rule. The main result from the two papers is that the majoritarian rule 
favors local public good provision over national public good provision whereas under 
proportional rule it is the opposite.  
In both cases the intuition for the result is the same. Under majoritarian rule, in 
order to get a majority of seats in the legislature or in order to win the presidency (the 
logic is thus valid for both presidential and parliamentary democracy) a party needs to 
target the pivotal voter in the pivotal district whereas under proportional rule, they 
target the pivotal voter in the country. Indeed, under proportional rule, to get a 
majority one needs to get the vote of the median voter in the country whereas under 
majoritarian rule there is a “median” district which will give a majority to one of the 
two parties. In that district, there is a pivotal voter, the median in that district, who 
will decide which party gets the seat in the district. Therefore, proposing local public 
goods targeted to the pivotal voter in the pivotal district is electorally “cheaper” than 
proposing national public goods.  
A corollary is that voters in the pivotal districts need not pay taxes for public 
goods in other districts. On the contrary, tax revenues from other districts can be used 
to finance local public goods in the pivotal district. They thus get more “value for 
money”. Under proportional electoral rule, it is the opposite. Since national public 
goods have many externalities, they may deliver more utility per voter per unit of tax 
revenue. In other words, they are assumed to be more efficient relative to local public 
goods. Nevertheless, majoritarian systems are biased towards local public goods 
because of the electoral incentives associated to the majoritarian rule. 
These results have clear implications for the political economy of agricultural 
distortions. In developed countries, if we assume that these distortions take mainly the 
form of local public goods or redistributive policy instruments, then one should 
observe, everything else equal, relatively more distortions under the majoritarian 
electoral rule than under the proportional electoral rule. One is more likely to find 
agricultural voters as pivotal voters under the majoritarian rule rather than under the 
proportional system. Indeed, it is less likely to find a farmer whose income is median 
in a developed country. However, it is much more plausible that a farmer may be 
median in a rural district if that district is pivotal for the elections.  
   14 
 
Persson, Roland and Tabellini (2007) model the effect of electoral rules within 
a parliamentary democracy. The model goes further than the rest of the literature on 
electoral rules, by incorporating not only different electoral rules but also their effect 
on party formation and government formation. It can indeed be argued that it is not 
very satisfactory to analyze electoral rules within the framework of a two-party 
system. Countries with proportional electoral rules typically have more than two 
parties represented in parliament, and countries with majoritarian rule are not 
necessarily all countries with two-party systems.  
Once we allow for more than two parties in a formal model, then we must 
model the interaction between the electoral process and legislative bargaining. Indeed, 
the election outcome or future election outcomes affect the choice of coalition 
partners which will in turn affect policy-making. Moreover, the electoral rule also 
affects incentives of parties to merge. The majoritarian rule gives an incentive to 
parties to merge, so as to win a maximum number of districts given the “winner take 
all” nature of the electoral rule. In other words, the merger of two parties may be able 
to achieve a number of seats that is much superior to the sum of the seats they would 
achieve as separate parties. Under the proportional system, this incentive is by 
definition absent. If two parties merge, they would get the sum of seat shares that the 
two separate parties would have.  
Under majoritarian electoral rule, the stronger incentive of parties to merge 
will lead more often to a two-party system and therefore less often to coalition 
governments. Under proportional rule, since there are fewer incentives to merge, there 
will be more parties represented in parliament and thus coalition governments will be 
more frequent. Under a coalition government, government expenditures will tend to 
be larger since parties in the coalition cater more to their own constituency and do not 
internalize the interests of the other party (-ies) in the coalition. This is related to the 
“common pool” problem. Therefore, one should see a larger number of parties, more 
coalition governments and higher government expenditures under proportional 
electoral rule compared to the majoritarian electoral rule. This is also verified 
empirically. 
The implications of this last model are less obvious in terms of the political 
economy of agricultural distortions, since there are no specific predictions in the 
model as to the type or composition of public expenditures. However, one could argue 
that a higher party fragmentation under proportional electoral rule might lead to a 
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higher frequency of parties in government representing rural interests. This 
implication runs counter to that of previous models discussed above.  
 
 
Government decision-making structure 
 
 
Another crucial component of the policy-making process depicted in Figure 1 is the 
assignment of authority to select and actually implement policies. Regardless of the 
political institutional structure, how political economic coalitions are formed, whether 
temporary or “permanent”, is critical. Here, we follow the work of Rausser, Swinnen 
and Zusman (2010) and adopt the Nash-Harsanyi bargaining game where both the 
first-stage disagreement payoffs and the second-stage cooperative solution are 
endogenously determined. For this framework, the election outcomes affect the choice 
of coalition partners. 
  In the simple version of the model, the objective function for the policymaking 
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From the basic specification (1) and (2) and the two-stage Nash-Harsanyi 
bargaining and coalition formation process, Rausser, Swinnen and Zusman (2010) 
derive a governing criterion function (sometimes referred to in the literature as a 
policy or political preference function) that isolates the distribution of political power 
across various coalitions. This basic structure for the governing criterion function can 
incorporate several levels of government, from the local to the national. The number 
of echelons in this hierarchy and the degree of interdependance among levels are 
determined by numerous factors, such as the geographic extent of the country, its 
population size and geographic dispersion, the development of infrastructure, the 
available organizational technology, the prevailing political culture, and the country’s 
history.  
In addition to vertical differentiation, there also exists a horizontal 
differentiation, which becomes more pronounced at the governmental hierarchy’s 
upper levels. Particularly with respect to agricultural distortions, two dimensions of 
governmental horizontal differentiation are important: first, differentiation by the 
governmental branch (legislative, executive, judicial); and second, the functional 
differentiation by fields of activity or economic industry (e.g., agriculture, trade). In 
some countries, policymaking authority is concentrated while in other countries it is 
distributed across the entire governmental structure. The distribution determines the 
configuration of policymaking centers relative to particular policies. To be specific, 
consider a group configuration comprising   interested policymaking centers and   
organized interest groups. Let   index the policymaking centers and 





00 00 = ( , ,..., )
g x xx x  be the 
vector of policy instruments controlled by the various policymaking centers. Under 
this specification, the extended objective functions of the policymaking centers are 
 
(3)     0
=1
= ( ) ( , ) ( , ) , =1,2,...,
n
jj jj k
jj i j i i k j k k j
ik j k j
Uu x s c S c c j k
≠≠
++ − ∑∑∑ δδ g
where   is the policy objective function of center  0 () j ux j  reflecting the center's 
decision agents' preferences over the entire policy space,  0 X ,  (, )
j j
ij i i scδ  is the 
strength of power of the   interest group over the 
th i
th j  center,  (, )
j j
kj k k Scδ  is center  's 




i c , 
j
k c  and 
k
j c  are, respectively, the costs of power 
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of the   interest group over the 
th i
th j  center, and the   center over the 
th k
th j  center, and 
the 
th j  center over the   center. Note that 
th k
j
i δ  and 
j
i δ  are strategy indicator 
variables determining whether a "reward" or "penalty" strategy has been adopted in 
the strategic interaction between the corresponding organized groups.  
Since reciprocal power relationships prevail among all organized groups, the 
equilibrium solution of the political economy is a solution to the corresponding 
-person bargaining game. For a case where all disagreement payoffs are 
treated as given, Rausser, Swinnen and Zusman (2010) show that the  political-
economic equilibrium is obtained by maximizing the following policy governance 
function with respect to 
( g + ) n
00 x X ∈ :    
(4)    00
=1
() = ( ()
g
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j t  are the specified disagreement outcomes or in general the 






An operational empirical analysis cannot be implemented without specifying the 
feasible set that constrains the optimization of the governing criterion or policy 
governance function, namely equation (4). Each of the relevant objective functions 
specified in this equation are interpreted in much of the literature as performance 
variables (endogenous variables) that are determined in part by the policy instruments. 
The actual constraint structure that the maximization of (4) is subject to depends on 
the underlying market structure, socioeconomic conditions, factor mobility, asset 
diversification, electoral rules, and the democratic or nondemocratic regimes 
discussed in the previous section. 
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  For equality constraint structures, the mapping from the policy instruments to 
the performance or endogenous variables is straightforward. Under these 
circumstances, the empirical analysis can focus on estimating the “political weights” 
or distribution of political power parameters in equations (4) and (5). Moreover, 
policy reaction functions can be empirically estimated by deriving the choice 
equations. Obviously, the former is a revealed preference analysis, while the latter is a 
typical direct analysis of the actual policy choices that are implemented. Although 
consistency (see the validation tests in Chapter 17 of Rausser, Swinnen and Zusman 
2010)) can be investigated by providing both analyses, in this section we consider 
only the reduced form specifications for the policy reaction functions (Rausser and 





For the redistributive policy instruments, two readily available alternative data sets 
exist. The first is for the aggregate agricultural nominal rates of assistance (NRAs) of 
each country covered over the period 1955 through 2007 (Anderson and Valenzuela 
2008). This same source has also decomposed the aggregate NRAs into their various 
sources such as taxes or subsidies on imports, exports, domestic output or 
intermediate inputs (depending on whether the product is classified as an import-
competing or exportable good, or if it is a nontradable). The NRAs show in most 
instances that the dominant portion of the NRA is the rate of assistance to output 
conferred by the border market price support, but border measures are also the most 
common forms of tax on exportables that should be explained. Regardless, this basic 
dataset allows a number of potential redistributive policy instruments to be evaluated.  
As previously noted, in the empirical literature a distinction has not been 
drawn between local versus national public goods. For the case of national public 
goods, the principal measure has been total expenditures on agricultural research and 
development. Here the ISNAR agricultural research expenditures by country and year 
are available. These data have been used in a number of empirical studies that appear 
in the literature (e.g., Lee and Rausser 1992, Swinnen, de Gorter and Banerjee 2000). 
                                                 
2 Due to space limitations, we cannot review the empirical insights presented in Rausser (2007) relating 
to interest group size, relevant demand and supply elasticities, size of deadweight losses, etc. 
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For local public goods, a readily available data source does not exist. As a 
result, piecing together the relevant time series data across countries will require a 
number of sources. One source is the rural public expenditure data reported by FAO 
that has recently been used by Allcott, Lederman and Lopez (2006). This data source 
would have to be augmented by the recent surge in agri-environmental expenditures, 
particularly by the developed countries in the data set. Still another source is the 
categories of expenditures reported by Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), particularly 
non-product-specific subsidies net of abnormal taxes for primary agriculture, and 




In addition to the explored explanatory variables identified in Anderson (1995), de 
Gorter and Swinnen (2002) and Rausser (2007), a number of unexplored or weakly 
explored subsets of explanatory variables should be considered. Many of these 
variables are summarized and maintained by the World Bank (see Appendix). 
However, one of the principal problems is that many of these data sources do not 
stretch over the full time period that is covered by the redistributive policy 
instruments in Anderson and Valenzuela (2008). Nevertheless, the critical political-
economic regimes outlined above can be captured through discrete regimes: 
dictatorial, parliamentary-democratic, and presidential-democratic. Similarly, discrete 
regimes can be used to distinguish at least two electoral rules: majoritarian and 
proportional.  
For the governance structures, including branches of government, role of 
bureaucracy, interest group access, and admissible coalitions, we are guided by the 
discussion in the previous section of this paper. Once again, discrete regimes will be 
critical in allowing us to distinguish across countries with regard to their propensity to 
pursue redistribution or provide local or national public good expenditures. Also note 
that here the various data sources on temporal consistency and credible commitment 
indicators (see appendix) should be assessed. Unfortunately, few of these indicator 
variables stretch back as far as even 1980. Finally, there is no need to restrict our 
investigation to internal polycentric governance structures. For many countries, 
external institutions such as GATT/WTO accession and World Bank and IMF 
conditionality effectiveness may prove to be significant explanatory variables. 
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Another potential subset of explanatory variables, largely unexplored, is sector 
mobility and asset diversification. As demonstrated in Rausser, Swinnen and Zusman 
(2010), in the limit sector mobility or asset diversification drive a convergence 
between “the special interest” and “the public interest”. For those countries with 
constitutional principles and institutional structures that promote resource mobility or 
asset diversification, a political-economic interest group structure will emerge that has 
little if any incentive to acquire and exercise political power. In essence, in the limit 
there is no incentive for various private sector interests, or for that matter for 
policymaking centers, to engage in the implementation of redistributive policies. One 
of the few empirical studies that focus on one dimension of farmer mobility was the 
seminal analysis of Gardner (1987). In his analysis, Gardner specified two geographic 
mobility variables, both of which were statistically significant in explaining the 
degree of distortions across commodities in the United States. More generally, with 
respect to all countries, potential data sources are available relating to sources for 
mobility and sources for asset diversification. For the former, various human capital 
measures of potential mobility stretch back as far as 1960, while for the latter, outputs 
by Deininger and Squire (1996, 1998) and their colleagues can be employed to initiate 
an investigation of asset diversification on the three groups of proposed endogenous 






Our purpose in this chapter has been to shine the spotlight on recent theoretical 
developments in political economy and what role they might play in explaining and 
reforming individual country and global distortions in food and agricultural markets. 
We have isolated a number of potential explanatory variables that may allow us to 
explain and distinguish between predatory or redistributive policies that result in 
market distortions, local public goods that serve the interest of political well-
positioned geographic regions of a particular country, and national public goods that 
promote economic growth and generally serve the “public interest”. 
The remarkable data set on agricultural distortions compiled by the World 
Bank (Anderson and Valenzuela 2008) provides a watershed opportunity for 
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describing patterns across time and countries that might potentially isolate the critical 
forces that explain the magnitude of redistribution and governmental support for both 
national and local public goods. To be sure, a number of challenges remain. These 
challenges include inter alia completing the time series for both agricultural public 
research and development expenditures and local public good expenditures across the 
time frame for which the net effects of redistributive instruments have been captured 
by the first stage of the World Bank analysis. The next major challenge is completing 
the statistical analysis, wisely separating the sample data which allows exploratory 
investigations (some would characterize as data mining) to be concluded before 
proposing the analysis that will allow testable hypotheses to be evaluated and 
assessed. A third challenge is to capture the dynamic implications of both “policy 
traps” and crisis shocks resulting from external changes that motivate new political-
economic equilibriums. In characterizing the patterns that emerge across time and 
countries, our emphasis should be on discontinuous jumps in the degree of 
redistribution or the investment in public good policies, both local and national. 
Finally, in the empirical sketch outlined in the previous section, capturing regime 
changes in the reduced form specifications may well allow insights to emerge on 
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Appendix: Variables for political econometrics of agricultural distortions 
 
Possible data sources for the following six sets of variables can be fourd in Appendix 
Table A. 
 
1. Voice and Accountability (VA) 
Extent to which a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their 
government as well as freedom of expression, association, and media. 
•  Accountability of public officials 
•  Civil liberties 
•  Freedom of press 
•  Military in politics 
•  Democratic accountability 
•  Representativeness: how well population can make voices heard in political 
system 
 
2. Political instability and absence of violence (PV) 
Perceptions of likelihood of government destabilized or overthrown by 
unconstitutional or violent means including political violence or terror. 
•  Military coup that reduces GDP growth rate 
•  Political terrorism, assassination that reduces GDP growth rate 
•  Ethnic tension 
•  Internal conflict – political violence and impact 
•  External conflict – risk to government and investment 
•  Civil unrest 
•  Extremism – threat by groups with narrow, fanatical beliefs 
 
3. Government effectiveness (GE) 
Quality of public services, civil services and degree of independence from political 
pressures, quality of policy formulation and implementation, and credibility of 
government commitments to such policies. 
•  Government personnel turnover rate that reduces GDP growth rate 
•  Institutional rigidity that reduces GDP growth rate 
•  Quality of bureaucracy 
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•  Public spending composition  
•  Quality of public infrastructure 
•  Quality of schools 
•  Policy consistency and forward planning 
•  Time spent by management dealing with govt officials 
 
4. Regulatory quality (RQ) 
Ability of government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that 
permit and promote private sector development 
•  Export reduction due to worse regulations (limits) 
•  Import reductions due to worse regulations (quotas) 
•  Increase in regulatory burdens 
•  Legal restrictions on non-resident ownership of equity 
•  Tax effectiveness 
•  Tax system distortionary 
 
5. Rule of law (RL) 
Extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by rules of society and in 
particular the quality of the contract enforcement.  
•  Increase in crime, kidnapping foreigners 
•  Enforceability of contracts (govt and private) 
•  Popular observance of law 
•  Impartiality of legal system, judicial independence 
•  Property rights, Intellectual property rights 
•  Legal framework to challenge govt actions 
 
6. Control of corruption (CC) 
Extent to which public power is exercised for private gain including petty and grand 
forms of corruption as well as capture of the state by elites and private interests.  
•  Increase in assessment of corruption 
•  Public trust in financial honesty of politicians 
•  Frequency of extra payments, bribery 
•  Red tape to be encountered 
•  Likelihood of encountering corrupt officials 
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•  Power through patronage rather than ability 
•  Accounting standards  
•  Transparency of decision making 28 
 
Appendix Table A: Sources of data for variables listed in this Appendix 
 
(a) Sources for World Bank Indicators 
 




countries Name of original indicator  Freedom (WBI)
Bertelsmann 
Transformation Index  2003  3 years  116-119  Competition  Economic (RQ) 
Economist Intelligence 
Unit  1997  Quarterly  120-152  Unfair competitive practices  Economic (RQ) 
Economist Intelligence 
Unit  1997  Quarterly  120-152  Price controls  Economic (RQ) 
Economist Intelligence 
Unit 1997  Quarterly  120-152  Discriminatory traiffs  Economic (RQ) 
Economist Intelligence 
Unit 1997  Quarterly  120-152  Excessive protections  Economic (RQ) 
Institute for Management 
Development, World 
Competitveness 
Yearbook  1987  Annual  46-53  Easy to start company  Economic (RQ) 
Institute for Management 
Development, World 
Competitveness 
Yearbook  1987 Annual  46-53 
The exchange rate policy of 
your country hinders the 
competitiveness of enterprises  Economic (RQ) 
Merchant International 
Group Gray Area 
Dynamics 1994  Quarterly  118-156  Unfair Competition  Economic (RQ) 
Merchant International 
Group Gray Area 
Dynamics  1994  Quarterly  118-156  Unfair Trade  Economic (RQ) 
World Economic Forum, 
Global Competitveness 
Survey  1996 Annual  58-126 
Competition in local market is 
limited Economic  (RQ) 
World Economic Forum, 
Global Competitveness 
Survey  1996 Annual  58-126 
Anti-monopoly policy is lax and 
ineffective Economic  (RQ) 
World Economic Forum, 
Global Competitveness 
Survey  1996  Annual  58-126  Easy to start company  Economic (RQ) 
Business Environment 
Risk Intelligence  1980  3/year  50-53 
Political Risk Index: Social 
Conditions: Wealth 
Distribution, Population  Economic (VA) 
Heritage Foundation, 
Index of Economic 
Freedom  1995  Annual  150-157  Labor Freedom  Economic (None)
Heritage Foundation, 
Index of Economic 
Freedom  1995  Annual  150-157  Property Rights  Economic (RL) 
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World Economic Forum, 
Global Competitveness 
Survey  1996 Annual  58-126 Undue  political  influence Political  (CC) 
Business Environment 
Risk Intelligence  1980  3/year  50-53 
Political Risk Index: 
Fractionalization of political 
spectrum and the power of these 
factions Political  (VA) 
Economist Intelligence 
Unit 1997  Quarterly  120-152  Vested  interests Political  (VA) 
Economist Intelligence 
Unit 1997  Quarterly  120-152 
Accountability of Public 
Officials Political  (VA) 
Freedom House, 
Freedom of the World  1972 Annual  149-197  Political  Rights  Political  (VA) 
Global Insight Business 
Risk and Conditions  1998  Annual  181-202  Representativeness Political  (VA) 
Cingranelli Richards 
Human Rights 
Database and Political 
Terror Scale  1980  Annual  159-192  Independence of Judiciary  Civil (RL) 
Economist Intelligence 
Unit 1997  Quarterly  120-152  Fairness  of  judicial process  Civil (RL) 
Economist Intelligence 
Unit 1997  Quarterly  120-152  Enforceability of contracts  Civil (RL) 
Economist Intelligence 
Unit  1997  Quarterly  120-152  Human Rights  Civil (VA) 
Freedom House, 
Countries at the 
Crossroads  2003  Annual  30-60  Civil Liberties  Civil (VA) 
Freedom House, 
Freedom of the World  1972  Annual  149-197  Civil Liberties  Civil (VA) 
Global Insight 
Business Risk and 
Conditions  1998  Annual  181-202  Judicial Independence  Civil (VA) 
 
 
(b) Temporal consistency and credible commitment indicators 
 




CountriesName of original indicator 
Global Insight Business 
Risk and Conditions   1998  Annual  181-202 
Representativeness: How well the population and 
organized interests can make their voices heard 
in the political system 
Political Risk Services 
International Country 
Risk Guide  1984  Monthly  130-140 
Government Stability: Measures the 
government’s ability to carry out its declared 
programs, and its ability to stay in office 
Business Environment 
Risk Intelligence  1980  3/year  50-53 
Restrictive (coercive) measures required to retain 
power 




Yearbook  1987  Annual  46-53  Risk of political instability 
Political Risk Services 
International Country 
Risk Guide  1984  Monthly  130-140 
Bureaucratic Quality: Measures institutional 
strength and quality of the civil service, assess 
how much strength and expertise bureaucrats 
have and how able they are to manage political 
alternations without drastic interruptions in 
government services, or policy changes.  
Global Insight Business 
Risk and Conditions   1998  Annual  181-202 
Policy consistency and forward planning: How 
confident businesses can be of the continuity of 
economic policy stance—whether a change of 
government will entail major policy disruption, 
and whether the current government has pursued 
a coherent strategy 
Global Insight Business 
Risk and Conditions   1998  Annual  181-202 
Tax Effectiveness: How efficient the country’s 
tax collection is. 
IMD World 
Competitiveness 
Yearbook 1987  Annual  46-53 
Real corporate taxes are non distortionary & Real 
personal taxes are non distortionary 
Global Insight Global 
Risk Service  1996  Quarterly  106-142  Enforceability of government contracts 
Global Insight Global 
Risk Service  1996  Quarterly  106-142  Enforceability of private contracts 
World Economic Forum 
Global Competitiveness 
Survey 1996  Annual  58-126 
Legal framework to challenge the legality of 
government actions is inefficient 
Heritage Foundation 
Index of Economic 
Freedom 1995  Annual  150-157  Property  Rights 
World Economic Forum 
Global Competitiveness 
Survey 1996  Annual  58-126  Public  trust  in financial honesty of politicians 
Merchant International 
Group Gray Area 
Dynamics 1994  Quarterly  118-156  Corruption. Largely bribery 
Political Risk Services 
International Country 
Risk Guide  1984  Monthly  130-140 
Corruption: Within the political system distorting 
the economic and financial environment 
 
(c) Sources for Mobility 
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CountriesName of original indicator 
African Development Bank 
Country Policy and Institutional 
Assessments  1998  Annual  15-52  Labor Market Policies 
Business Environment and 
Enterprise Performance Survey  1999  3 years  18-27 
How problematic are labor regulations 
for the growth of your business? 
Heritage Foundation Index of 
Economic Freedom  1995  Annual  150-157  Labor Freedom 
Castello and Domenech (2002) 
1960-
2000     108  Human capital Gini coefficient 
Barro (2001) 
1965-
1995     100 
Human Capital measure based on test 
scores, years of schooling, dropout 
rates and pupil-teacher ratios 
Birdsall and Londono (1997) 
 1970-
1995     43  Human Capital: Years of Education 
 
 
(d) Sources for asset diversification 
 




CountriesName of original indicator 
Business Environment Risk 
Intelligence 1980  3/year  50-53 
Political Risk Index: Internal Causes of 
Political Risk: Wealth Distribution, 
Population 
IFAD Rural Sector 
Performance Assessments  2004  Annual  100-124  Access to land 
Deininger and Squire (1998) 
1950-
1990 Decade  103 
Gini coefficients on land distribution, 
derived from FAO Agricultural Censuses 
Deininger and Olinto (2000)            
Li, Squire and Zou (1998)  1998  Once  115  Land inequality Gini 
Deininger and Squire (1996)
1890-
1996  Annual  138  Income inequality Gini coefficients* 
Dollar and Kraay (2002) 
1960-
2000  Annual  92  Income inequality Gini coefficients 
Taylor and Hudson (1972)  1960  Once  54  Land distribution Gini 
 
 